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In this paper we study the interaction between macroeconomic environment and 
firms’ balance sheet effects in Brazil during the 1990’s. We start by assessing the 
influence of macroeconomic conditions on firms’ debt composition in Brazil. We found 
that larger firms tend to change debt currency composition more in response to a change 
in the exchange rate risk than small firms. We then proceed to investigate if and how 
exchange rate balance sheet effects affected the firms’ investment decisions. We test 
directly the exchange rate balance sheet effect on investment. Contrary to earlier findings 
(Bleakley and Cowan, 2002), we found that firms more indebted in foreign currency tend 
to invest less when there is an exchange rate devaluation. We tried different controls for 
the competitiveness effect. First, we control directly for the effect of the exchange rate on 
exports and imported inputs. We then pursue an alternative investigation strategy, 
inspired by the credit channel literature. According to this perspective, Tobin’s q can 
provide an adequate control for the competitiveness effect on investment. Our results 
provide supporting evidence for imperfect capital markets, and for a negative exchange 
rate balance sheet effect in Brazil. The results concerning the exchange rate balance sheet 
effect on investment are statistically significant and robust across the different 
specifications. We tested the results across different periods, classified according to the 
macroeconomic environment. Our findings suggest that the negative exchange rate 
balance sheet effect we found in the whole sample is due to the floating exchange rate 
period. We also found that exchange rate devaluations have important negative impact on 
both cash flows and sales of indebted firms. Furthermore, the impact of exchange rate 
variations is asymmetric, and the significant effect detected when no asymmetry is 
imposed is engendered by exchange rate devaluations. 
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 1. Introduction 
 
The macroeconomic environment interacts with the firms’ balance sheet structure in a 
two-way relationship. On one hand, macroeconomic environment is central in shaping 
the capital markets, determining what kind of contracts is feasible and enforceable. 
Moreover, it also affects the incentives faced by firms when selecting their financial 
contracts. Conversely, the firms’ balance sheet structure affects crucially the result of 
macroeconomic policies, influencing policymakers’ choices of regimes and policy rules. 
In this paper we study the balance sheet effects of exchange rates and interest rates in 
Brazil since 1990, using a panel data set with firm level variables. For this endeavor, we 
also consider how the macroeconomic environment affected the debt composition and 
interacted with firms’ level balance sheet effects. 
 
Balance sheet effects on investment and production rely on capital market 
imperfections. According to the credit channel literature (see Bernanke and Gertler, 
1995), imperfect information creates a wedge between internal and external finance. An 
adverse shock to the net worth of a financially constrained firm increases its cost of 
external financing and decreases the ability or incentive to invest, and to implement 
production plans. It should impact firms differently, being stronger for firms that face 
higher premium of external finance costs relative to internal finance (see Hubbard, 1998). 
 
There is substantial empirical evidence that proxies for firms’ net worth affect 
investment more for low net worth than for high net worth firms (Hubbard 1998). 
Therefore, to the extent that exchange rate and interest rate variations affect firms’ net 
worth, their balance sheet effect should matter for determining investment. Firms will see 
their financial condition deteriorate whenever they have substantial debt at floating 
interest rates, and the relevant real interest rate increases. This can happen if they have 
foreign denominated debt and the real exchange rate depreciates, entailing an exchange 
rate balance sheet effect. An interest rate effect takes place when firms have substantial 
short-term domestic debt or long-term debt contracted at floating rates, since their loans 
will be rolled over at higher rates.  
 
In the case of interest rates, it engenders a financial accelerator, which magnifies the 
traditional interest rate channel (Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist, 1999). In the case of 
exchange rate, it should counteract the expansionary effect of the competitive channel 
(Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee, 2001).
1 Thus, while the question in the interest rate 
literature is about the magnitude of the recessive impact of interest rate rises the debate in 
the recent exchange rate literature is about whether exchange rate devaluations are 
expansionary or contractionary.  
 
Harvey and Roper (1999) argued, in an investigation which used firm level indicators, 
that the exchange rate balance sheet effect greatly exacerbated the Asian Crisis. Bleakley 
and Cowan (2002) and Forbes (2002) tested the empirical relevance of exchange rate 
balance sheet effects using multinational panel regressions with firm level data. The 
                                                 
1 Additionally, the existence of imported inputs could also be an extra channel for the exchange rate 
contractionary effect (Reif, 2001).  4
former work used a panel data for over 500 non-financial firms in five Latin American 
countries, dominated by Brazilian firms (52.5% of the observations). They found that 
holding foreign-currency denominated debt was associated with more investment during 
exchange rate devaluations, contrary to the predicted sign. On the other hand, Forbes 
(2002) found that more indebted firms had lower net income growth after a large 
depreciation. Although she used a larger sample of countries, she only examined large 
depreciations.  
 
One advantage of focusing in one specific country is that we can take into 
consideration the relevant specifics of the macroeconomic environment. The 
macroeconomic conditions changed drastically in the last 12 years in Brazil. First there 
was an important trade liberalization, which occurred in the early 1990’s. 
Simultaneously, the control of international financial flows was softened, increasing the 
access of Brazilian firms to foreign liabilities. The Real plan in 1994 ended the high 
inflation period in Brazil, unveiling the new incentives, and at the same time creating 
additional ones. The sudden reduction of inflation rate and its volatility contributed for 
the strengthening of credit relations and for the lengthening of debt maturities. This 
happened at first in an environment characterized by low volatility of the real exchange 
rate. In the beginning of 1999 the exchange rate was allowed to float. This change of 
exchange rate regime was complemented by the adoption of an inflation targeting 
monetary regime. As a result, exchange rate became very volatile while interest rate 
policy became focused on bringing inflation to target.  
 
Our investigation evolves around two issues. The first topic we study is the 
determinants of debt composition, focusing on currency denomination and maturity. 
Then, we investigate the balance sheet effects of exchange rate devaluations and interest 
rates. The issues are interrelated since the balance sheet effects of exchange rate and 
interest rates depend on currency denomination and maturity of debt. 
 
At firm level, investment is the candidate variable potentially more influenced by 
balance sheet effects. Balance sheet effects might additionally affect production. Since 
this variable was not available, we used sales as its proxy. Since firms cash flow could be 
an important channel through which balance sheet deterioration affect investment, we 
also investigate how cash flows affect investment (also a usual measure of capital market 
imperfection), and how they are influenced by our balance sheet effects. 
 
We start by studying the relation between the macroeconomic environment and the 
balance sheet structure. After briefly providing some background information about the 
macroeconomic reforms in Brazil, we proceed by analyzing the determinants of debt 
composition. Our main finding is that large firms react more to an increase in exchange 
rate risk than smaller firms by reducing the proportion of foreign currency debt in their 
liabilities. We then study the balance sheet effects. We perform several tests, starting with 
some basic equation where the balance sheet effect of exchange rate is tested directly. 
According to our results, firms with higher level of dollar indebtedness invest less when 
exchange rate is devalued. The effect is statistically significant, and is maintained when 
controls for the effect of exchange rate on investment through exports and imported  5
inputs are added. There is also some weaker evidence that firms in industries with higher 
proportion of imported inputs invest less when the real exchange rate is more depreciated. 
We also test interest rate balance sheet effects, but we found no evidence of such an 
effect in our sample. We then investigate how the macroeconomic environment 
influenced our results. More concretely we allow exchange rate balance sheet effects to 
vary over the three periods we divided our sample. Our findings suggest that the negative 
exchange rate balance sheet effect we found in the whole sample is due to the floating 
exchange rate period.  
 
We also explore the link between balance sheet effects and investment through a 
common test of capital market imperfection. In principle Tobin’s q could provide a better 
control for the competitiveness effect on investment since it should capture all investment 
opportunities. Our results provide evidence for imperfect capital markets, and for a 
negative balance sheet effect of exchange rate depreciations. Exchange rate depreciations 
could reduce cash flows and still have further effects on balance sheets. In order to get a 
more detailed account of those different channels we look into an additional effect of 
exchange rate variation on more indebted firms, even after controlling for cash flows. We 
found that the effect is smaller, but still statistically significant. On the other hand, we test 
if firms more indebted in foreign currency have lower cash flows during exchange rate 
depreciations. The effect is strong and highly statistically significant. Since it could be 
attributed both an increase in financial expenses and to a decrease in production, we also 
test for an exchange rate balance sheet effect on sales. Again we found a strong highly 
significant negative effect.  
 
We also follow the capital market imperfections tradition by testing if the balance 
sheet effects are stronger for firms with characteristics that make them more likely to be 
financial constrained. The characteristics we test are size (market capitalization), foreign 
ownership, belonging to tradable sector, and having issued an ADR. None of those 
characteristics have a differential impact on the balance sheet effect. 
 
Finally, we test if the effect of exchange rate variation on investment, cash flows and 
sales was asymmetric. We found that only depreciations have a significant differential 
impact on firms more indebted in foreign currency. The coefficients found for the 
interaction between exchange rate depreciation and debt in foreign currency was of the 
same order of magnitude of those found without discriminating between depreciations 
and appreciations.   
  
We proceed as follows. In the next section we provide the general macroeconomic 
background for the period of analysis. In section 3 describe our database. In the next 
section we investigate the determinants of the debt composition. We test for the existence 
of balance sheet effects in Brazil in section 5. Section 6 draws macroeconomic 
implications and concludes. 
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2. Macroeconomic and Institutional Environment 
 
The reforms in Brazil changed substantially the macroeconomic environment. This 
should affect the restrictions and incentives firms face when deciding how to finance 
their activities, and specially investment. The equity market in Brazil remained in the 
whole period as a marginal source of funds. Therefore, the sources of funds for 
investment were either retained profits or debt. Given the high level of interest rates, and 
the scarcity of long-term loans caused by the macroeconomic instability, the internal 
source was presumably very important.  
 
Our period of analysis starts in the early nineties, when tariffs were substantially 
reduced. The average nominal tariff plunged from 39.6% in 1988 to 11.2% in 1994. 
Trade liberalization should make firm performance more sensitive to exchange rate, since 
it should play a more relevant role in determining the competitiveness of domestic 
tradable products. There was also an important financial liberalization that gave firms 
more access to foreign assets and liabilities. Among the important advancements in this 
direction we could cite the successful launch of an important privatization program, the 
reached agreement to restructure arrears on its external debt, and the approved new rules 
allowing foreign investment in domestic market and the financing of Brazilian firms in 
foreign markets (see Table 1). However, macroeconomic instability was still responsible 
for a reduced supply of foreign and domestic long-term credit. 
 
In 1994, the Real plan succeeded in finishing the chronic inflationary process. Brazil 
has had one of the world’s longest high inflation processes (see Figure 1B). Long-term 
debt and financial assets had practically disappeared, and even shorter-term financial 
instruments had become indexed to the inflation rate or to the daily interest rate. Low 
inflation coupled with new financial regulation which outlawed indexation provided a 
completely new environment for financial decisions, resulting in increased debt maturity 
and reduced indexation.  
 
From July 1994, and 1998, with exception of the initial eight months where it was let 
to appreciate (see Figure 1C), the exchange rate was controlled and stable, as the Central 
Bank was committed to prevent any abrupt devaluation
2. The successful stabilization 
contributed to a substantial increase in the flow of foreign investments. However, the 
recurrent emerging markets crises would make the flow cyclical. As a response, the 
government changed cyclically the legislation, reducing the incentives to capital inflows 
in the good times, and undoing it in the bad times. Few months after the stabilization, the 
Mexican crisis hit capital inflows to Brazil severely. The situation was reversed in the 
second semester of 1995. From then on, external debt became a relatively important 
source of financing for large firms, subject to cyclical interruptions in the new flows 
caused by the succession of emerging markets crisis. 
 
                                                 
2 For a detailed analysis of the exchange rate policy in Brazil during the nineties see Bonomo and Terra 
(2001)  7
When uncertainty about the sustainability of the crawling-peg exchange rate regime 
increased, firms started to hedge against the exchange rate devaluation risk. In January 
1999, exchange rate was allowed to float. As a complement to the floating exchange rate 
regime, the Central Bank adopted an inflation-targeting framework for monetary policy 
in June. As a result exchange rate became much more volatile, although interest rate 
became less volatile. Under the free-floating regime, the risk of adoption of capital 
controls was reduced, which stimulated further the supply of foreign credit. 
 
In this environment firms had more incentive to bear interest rate risk and to hedge 
exchange rate risk. There are several instruments for hedging exchange rate risks in the 
Brazilian economy, such as exchange rate futures contracts, dollar indexed government 
bonds, swaps, dollar currency, foreign assets, etc. In the recent period, a frequent hedging 
mechanism used by firms is the acquisition of swaps from banks involving the exchange 
of interest in domestic currency for dollar-indexed payments. This mechanism is 
preferred because banks make tailor-made contracts according to the firm’s necessity. On 
the other hand, banks are not exposed to exchange rate risk because they have dollar 
indexed government bonds in their portfolios. Thus, in net terms, hedge is provided by 
government, with banks’ intermediation.  
 
In Figure 2B, we can see that the proportion of the domestic federal debt securities 
indexed to the exchange rate more than doubled in 4 years, increasing from about 15% in 
December 1997 to about 33% in December 2001. This figure underestimates the increase 
in hedge since the Central Bank also offered exchange rate swaps attached to domestic 
currency. 
 
Another important aspect is that, because of the macroeconomic instability, there is 
no private supply of long-run loans for investment in Brazil. The main provider of long-
term loans is the Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES). These loans were 
indexed to inflation before stabilization. After the Real plan, inflation indexation with 
fixed interest rate was substituted by floating interest rate (named TJLP). This interest 
rate is decided by the National Monetary Council with base on the inflation target and 
Brazil’s risk premium, and is lower and more stable than the market rates (see Figure 
2C.). Figure 2D shows the proportion of BNDES loans in total loans to the private sector. 
It amounted to more than 12% of the total loans of the financial system at the end of 
2001, which should correspond to a very large part of the long-term domestic loans. 
 
During the whole period of analysis, the GDP had a stop and go pattern (Figure 1A). 
There was a deep recession in the early nineties, caused by the Collor Plan (see Figure 
1A and Table 1). Then, the economy recovered and attained high growth rates in 1993 
and 1994, and moderate rates from 1995 to 1997. As a result of the successive emerging 
market crisis and the anticipation of the Brazilian crisis, there was stagnation in 1998, and 
a timid recovery in 1999. The economy accelerated again to a 4.3% rate of growth in 
2000. But contagion from Argentinean crisis, and the internal oil crisis caused another 
deceleration in 2001. In 2002 the perspective of a left victory in the elections was to 
blame for the mediocre performance, with growth rates around 1.5%. The aggregate  8
investment rate, as a capital stock ratio, remained stable around 5% (Figure 1D): a 
mediocre rate engendered by the unstable macroeconomic environment. 
 
 
3. Database Description 
 
This section describes the sample and variables under study. Our main data consists 
of firm-level accounting information for Brazilian non-financial corporations and 
country-level data, organized as a panel data set. The time period under investigation 
ranges from 1990 to 2002, with yearly observations.
3 
 
We started by using balance sheet data of a large sample of firms provided by Austin 
Asis of listed and unlisted companies. The use of the whole data set for investigating the 
above issues was not fruitful, possibly because unlisted firms balance sheets are not 
required to be audited in Brazil. Then, we decided to restrict our investigation to open 
firms, using both the Austin Asis and Economatica data sets to construct our variables of 
interest and enlarge the number of observations in each regression.
4 
 
Additionally, we have data describing the firm’s ownership structure and reported 
ADR issues collected from CVM, as well as measures of export orientation 
(exports/production) and imported inputs at industry level obtained at the FUNCEX. 
 
In Table 2 we report the number of observations in the sample per year, which 
remains stable with an average of 263.3 firms per year. In Table 3 we report the mean 
and median for the variables (and its interactions) under estimation.  
 
Our main dependent variable is Investment, measured as the change in net property 
and equipment added depreciation.
5 During the estimation procedure, all firm variables 
were calculated as ratios to capital stock measured as the net property and equipment at 
the beginning of the year. In the appendix we describe all the variables used in detail.  
 
 
4. Analysis of the debt composition 
 
The first topic we study is the determinants of debt composition, focusing on currency 
denominated and maturity. 
                                                 
3 Quarterly accounting numbers and monthly market variables are available and used in the construction of 
some variables. 
4 We used capital and debt variables from Austin and the remaining ones from Economatica. The number 
of observations in each regression was much smaller in earlier versions, where the balance sheet data were 
based only on Economatica.  
5 We experimented  capital expenditures as a measure of investment, from Economatica, but the results 
were not qualitatively different, other than loosing significance because the number of observations in each 
regression become much smaller. Then, we moved back to capital stock differences in order to increase the 




In order to investigate the factors determining the changes in debt composition, we 
estimate equations for the ratio of dollar-debt D
* over total debt D, and of long-term debt 
DLT over total debt D. We estimated the following equation: 
it t it it t it y f f m c r ε β α + + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + =  
where  it r  is a debt ratio,  t m ’s are variables capturing the macroeconomic environment 
and  it f ’s are firms’ individual features.  
 
As  it r  is necessarily between zero and 1, the distribution of the right hand side variable is 
truncated, and tends to have atoms in the limits. We chose to estimate a Tobit model, 
which is an appealing specification when the range bounds have a relatively large 
proportion of observations. We checked that this is the case in our sample. 
 
This equation is a reduced form and should reflect factors influencing both the 
demand and the supply for loans. 
 
With imperfect capital markets, supply of funds becomes a relatively more important 
determinant of the debt composition. In particular, the availability of external funds 
depends on the liquidity of the international capital markets and on the international 
assessment of the country risk. Thus, the foreign supply of external debt is a key 
determinant of the dollar debt.  
 
As for the demand of loans, one could think in a natural segmentation between short-
term and long-term depending on its use. First, one should try to match maturities in 
order to reduce risk. Thus, if the use is long-term investment, one should try to get long-
term loans with fixed real interest rates because this would reduce its risk. If it is for 
working capital, one should get short-term loans. Although considerations of risk lead to 
a natural segmentation, important differences in costs or shortage of the desired type of 
loan could lead to mismatch. In Brazil, given the advantage in cost of a long-term 
subsidized BNDES loan, every firm that could qualify for it would prefer to use it than a 
short-term loan. The external funds are presumably more risky because of the exchange 
rate variation. The incentive to borrow in external currency would come either from the 
unavailability of domestic funds, as often happens for long-run loans, or from its lower 
cost. Even in this case, the use of the loan should play a role. External loans tend to be 
less risky in the context of export activities investment. It is also attractive if it is used to 
import inputs, since those have their prices set in dollars. Other consideration that should 
matter is the firm’s ownership. An external loan is less risky in the perspective of a 
foreign shareholder, presuming that she has other assets in dollars. Thus, a foreign loan 
should be more attractive for a foreign owned firm. However, those differences should be 
less important in the recent years when hedge against exchange rate fluctuations became 
widely available. In some periods, borrowing abroad and hedging domestically became 
cheaper than borrowing domestically. However, as in the case of domestic long-term 
loans, foreign loans were not accessible to all firms.  10
 
Finally, given the high level of interest rates, and the scarcity of long-term loans 
caused by the macroeconomic instability, the firms’ internal savings were presumably a 
very important source of funds for investment, especially before the stabilization.  
 
For the foreign debt ratio equation we chose m as volatility of real exchange rate, and 
interacted it with size (proxied by log K). When r is the log-term debt ratio we chose m as 
volatility of inflation, and also interacted it with as size (log K). We also tested the direct 
effect of having an ADR, being a foreign-owned firm, and belonging to the tradable 
sector. One would expect that volatility of RER would affect the risk of foreign debt, and 
that volatility of inflation would affect the risk of long-term debt. It is also expected that 
large firms have a better access to financial markets, and therefore could change their 
portfolios in response to a change in risk. Therefore one would expect that an increase in 
the volatility of real exchange rate would reduce more the demand of foreign debt by 
large firms. Similarly an increase in the volatility of inflation would reduce more the 
demand for long-term loans by large firms. In terms of the equation above, if demand is 
the prevailing effect on the debt rations, the coefficient α in both equations should be 
negative. We also expect a positive coefficient for the direct effect of our size proxy (log 
K), and for the ADR dummy, since a larger firm and a firm that issued an ADR should be 
better access to the restricted foreign and long-term loan markets. One would also expect 
a positive coefficient for the foreign ownership and tradable sector dummies in the 
equation for the foreign currency debt ratio, since firms with those features have a better 




Table 4 reports the results of our Tobit regressions for the ratio of debt in foreign 
currency to total debt. In the first column we have only size and the interaction between 
the volatility of the real exchange rate and size as explanatory variables. The coefficient 
of the interaction between the volatility of the real exchange rate and size has the 
negative expected sign and is highly statistically significant. This can be interpreted as 
meaning that larger firms are more able to reduce foreign debt when its risk increased. 
The size variable has also a statistically significant positive coefficient, which is expected 
sign. Those results are maintained in the other regressions, when we add other firm level 
controls. In the second column we add a dummy for firms with ADR’s. The ADR 
dummy has the positive expected coefficient, statistically significant at 1%, a result 
which is maintained in other regressions. In the third column we add a dummy for foreign 
owned firms and in the fourth we also include a dummy for firms in the tradable sector. 
The coefficients of the foreign ownership and tradable dummies are not significantly 
different from zero. 
 
Table 5 presents similar regressions for the ratio of long-term to total debt, the only 
change being that we now use volatility of inflation in the place of volatility of real 
exchange rate. In the first column we have a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient for the interaction variable, at 10% level. However, when we add other  11
controls, this coefficient becomes negative and statistically significant at 1%. This is the 
expected sign, meaning that a larger firm is less likely to have long-term debt when 
inflation is higher. Both the coefficients of the size variable and of the ADR dummy are 
always negative and statistically significant, while the foreign ownership and tradable 
dummy coefficients are never significantly different from zero.  The interpretation of 
some of those results is more troublesome. This is because in Brazil the National 
Development Bank is the main provider of long-term loans, and those loans tend to be 
subsidized. Then, the results could reflect more government policy than firms’ choices. 
The negative sign of the size and of the ADR value could mean that the government 
favors smaller firms, without access to international financial markets. 
 
5. Investment and Balance Sheet Effects 
 
Bleakley and Cowan (2002) investigated the balance sheet effect of exchange rate 
using a sample where more than a half of observations were due to Brazilian firms. They 
found that the effect of an exchange rate devaluation was positive and statistically 
significant, which implies that balance sheet effects are not important. We intend to 
investigate this result by running different specifications of the investment equation. 
We start by testing directly the balance sheet effects in some basic dynamic panel 
regressions. Then, we look at the role of capital market imperfections, firm heterogeneity, 
and macroeconomic environment.  
 
In estimating the dynamic panel regressions below, we could not use an OLS 
estimator, since it will be seriously biased due to correlation of the lagged dependent 
variable with the individual specific effects. A usual technique for dealing with variables 
that are correlated with the error term is to instrument them. 
 
The econometric method used in the paper is based on Arellano and Bond (1991) 
seminal work. The paper presents specifications and methodology that are applicable to 
estimate a dynamic model from panel data by generalized method of moments (GMM). 
The GMM was introduced by L. Hansen (1982) and its  basic advantage is that requires 
specifications of moment conditions instead of the full model probability density.  The 
Arellano and Bond instruments exploit optimally all the linear moment restrictions that 
follow from the assumption of no serial correlation in the errors and no strictly exogenous 
variables. Although the Arellano and Bond(1991) work specify all the feasible 
instruments, our estimation uses a more parsimonious approach, using just the second to 
sixth lags of differenced variables, for a GMM difference estimator or including also the 
same lags for the variables in level for a GMM system estimator. We use first step 
estimators, because the parameter values of the two-step are underestimated. However, 
the Sargan test of overidentifying restriction for this estimator is not robust. Therefore we 
use two-step estimators to generate the Sargan test statistics. 
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5.1. Direct tests 
5.1.1 Basic regressions 
 
Our strategy is to test first directly for the balance sheet effect of the exchange rate by 
running the following regression, 
 













































               
(1) 
where  it I is the firm’s investment,  t RER is the real exchange rate,  t η  are year dummies  
and  i µ  firms fixed effects. Our main focus is on the coefficient of the interaction between 
the real exchange rate depreciation and the debt in foreign currency. The total debt and 
debt in foreign currency are firm level controls. The year dummies intend to capture the 
variation of the macroeconomic environment through time.  
 
If this equation captures an exchange rate balance sheet effect, one would expect a 
negative coefficient for the interaction between the foreign currency debt and exchange 
rate devaluation. The interpretation is that exchange rate devaluations affect more 
adversely a firm with higher foreign debt. A necessary condition for this effect is the 
existence of capital market imperfections. When a positive sign is found, the usual 
interpretation (Bleakley and Cowan, 2002) is that an exchange rate devaluation also 
entails a positive substitution effect, due to higher exports profitability, and that a firm 
with higher external debt is also more likely to experience a larger impact from this 
effect. When a negative coefficient is found, one could also attribute it to a negative 
substitution effect, which appeared because of the importance of imported inputs for the 
firms in the sample, if higher external debt and importance of imported inputs are related. 
In order to control for those effects, one could add exchange rate interactions with 
exports and imports in our explanatory variables. Since we did not have the proportion of 
exports and of imported inputs at firm level, we used industry level data for those 
variables. 
 
5.1.1 Results of direct tests 
 
Table 6 reports the results. The first four columns report static specifications of 
equation (1), without the lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable. We have 
the OLS, the Within Groups, GMM difference and system estimates. The Within Groups 
estimate accounts for random individual effects and the GMM (one step) estimates 
account for possible endogeneity of explanatory variables. The GMM difference 
estimator uses the equation in difference form, and uses lagged differences of explanatory 
variables as instruments. The system estimator uses both lagged difference and levels of 
explanatory variables as instruments. The GMM specifications are not rejected by the 
overidentifying restriction test, which was based on two-step estimators. All of the four 
estimations produced similar results. The coefficient of the interaction variable was  13
negative and statistically significant at 1% and at 5%, for the GMM estimations and for 
the others, ranging from -0.33 to -0.39. This suggests the existence of exchange rate 
balance sheet effects. The external debt is also positive and statistically significant at 5% 
for all estimations and at 1% for the GMM. This indicates that investment is positively 
related with a higher level of external debt in Brazil, which could be a reflex of the 
underdevelopment of the domestic long-term capital markets. The time-dummies are 
jointly statistically significant at 1% in all four equations. 
 
The next four columns report the results of equivalent estimations for the dynamic 
specification. The coefficients of the interaction variable continue to be negative, and are 
significant at 5% in the OLS and within-group estimations, at 1% at the GMM difference 
estimation, and not significant in the GMM system estimation. The coefficient of external 
debt is also positive and statistically significant in three of the four equations. The 
coefficient of lagged investment is negative in all four regressions, what is consistent 
with the results obtained in Terra (2003), and Ferrua and Menezes (2002)
6. The 
coefficient is statistically significant in the OLS and within-groups estimations, but not in 
the GMM estimations. Time-to-build aspects tend to generate positive correlation in 
investment. However, investment is also characterized as lumpy and intermittent, due to 
kinky adjustment costs (see Caballero and Engel,1999, Dorns and Dunne, 1993). This 
latter aspect may lead to negative correlation
7. Notice that the GMM specifications do not 
pass the Sargan test. 
 
The negative results obtained for the coefficient of the interaction between the dollar 
debt and exchange rate devaluation could also reflect a negative competitiveness effect of 
a higher proportion of imported input in the firms with higher external debt. Because of 
this, we add the interactions of multilateral exchange rate with sector exports and with 
input sector imports in the basic specification (equation 1), in order to capture the 
competitiveness effect, hoping that the coefficient of the interaction of exchange rate 
devaluation with foreign currency debt would now reflect mostly the balance sheet effect. 
The results are reported in the first column of table 7. The export interaction coefficient is 
positive, but not statistically significant. The import interaction coefficient is negative 
and statistically significant at 10% level, indicating that firms that import more inputs 
tend to reduce their investment more when there is an exchange rate devaluation. The 
coefficient of the interaction between exchange rate devaluation and debt in foreign 
currency is still negative, and now it is significant at 1% level. The specifications now 
pass the Sargan test. Notice that the magnitude of the gamma coefficient decreased 
slightly, what could suggest the interpretation that the coefficients in the estimation 
before were inflated by the negative competitiveness effect of imported inputs 
participation. 
 
                                                 
6 One could think that the negative coefficient is obtained because the all the three mentioned papers 
calculate investment from capital stock data. However, in earlier stages of our work we obtained the same 
negative coefficient when we used capital expenditures data as investment. Capital expenditure is available 
from Economatica but not from Austin. Its use limited severely our sample size.  
7 Those two different aspects may be both present, and may possibly lead to positive correlation in 
investment over short time intervals, and negative correlation over longer time intervals.   14
The interaction coefficient estimate in the GMM dynamic regressions with control for 
exports and imports effects is -0.26. We could interpret this coefficient as representing 
the exchange rate balance sheet effect. Thus, if we assume that the coefficient is -0.25 for 
example, it would indicate that a devaluation of 10% reduces investment in 2.5% of the 
magnitude of the dollar debt, which can be a very sizeable effect. 
 
In the second column we have cash flows and sales as additional controls, but not the 
export and import interaction terms. Both sales and cash flow coefficients are not 
statistically significant. The coefficient of the interaction between exchange rate 
devaluation and debt in foreign currency is still negative and significant at 5%. However, 
the specification does not pass the Sargan test. In the last column we add the export and 
import interaction terms to this specification. The sales and cash flow coefficients are still 
not statistically significant, and neither are coefficients of export and import interactions. 
However, the coefficient that represents the exchange rate balance sheet effect has its 
significancy increased, and the specification now passes the Sargan test. 
 
Finally one could also argue that those controls do not capture an important part of 
the substitution effect, because this should also be important for firms producing for the 
domestic market. For example, a devaluation should increase protection for domestic 
producers of tradable goods, and allow them to have a higher profit margin. As a 
consequence, they would be more stimulated to invest. We will return to this issue in the 
next subsection.  
 
Bleakley and Cowan (2002) found a positive and statistically significant coefficient 
for gamma in a sample dominated by Brazilian firms, which is in contrast with the result 
we found. They ran a slightly different regression. For comparison purposes we also ran 
some of the same regressions they ran, which include the direct effect of an exchange rate 
devaluation in the right-hand side. In the appendix we present the results for their static 
specification, and of a dynamic version, where we use the GMM difference estimation 
method to control for endogeneity of the explanatory variable. We also added the 
interaction terms involving sector imports and exports as explanatory variables but 
interacting with devaluation of the real bilateral exchange rate, as they did.  We ran the 
regressions using the whole sample and using the 1991-1999 subsample, which 
corresponds to the years of their sample. In all regressions with the whole sample we 
found a negative and significant coefficient, ranging from about -0.40 to -0.30. In the 
restricted sample the results are positive and not significantly different from zero for the 
regressions without export and import controls. When we add the import and export 
interaction terms as explanatory variables, our main coefficient of interest become 
negative for the GMM estimations, and significant at 10% level for the static 
specification. 
 
Those results suggest that the main reason for the different findings is the length of 
the sample. Their sample has only one year of floating exchange rage regime. It is not 
easy to find an exchange rate balance sheet effect when the exchange rate is stable most 
of the time. Our sample has three more years of floating regime, and the negative and 
statistically significant coefficients for gamma appear even in the OLS static regressions.  15
Another minor factor is the estimation method. When we estimate their equation using 
their restricted sample by GMM we found a negative coefficient, although not as 
statistically significant as the results we found for the whole sample.  
 
5.2 Interest rate effects 
 
Interest rates in Brazil were particularly volatile during the period exchange rates 
were controlled. A domestic interest rate increase could cause deterioration in the 
balance sheet of locally indebted firms, leading to a decrease in investment. In 
parallel to our tests of the exchange rate balance sheet effect, we ran a similar 
equation but with local currency debt in the place of dollar debt and real interest rate 
in the place of real exchange rate devaluation: 
















































LC D  is the debt in local currency and r is the domestic real interest rate. 
 
  The results, for a GMM difference estimation, are reported in the first column of 
table 8. The interaction term is not significantly different from zero. The domestic debt 
and the total debt coefficients are statistically significant at 1% with symmetric 
coefficients. The coefficient of total debt is about 0.12 and that of the local debt about -
0.12. We can interpret these findings as reflecting the importance of the omitted debt 
foreign debt variable for investment. This assessment is reinforced by the fact that 0.12 is 
also the order of magnitude of the coefficient of external debt in tables 6, and 7, whereas 
the total debt coefficient is not significantly different from zero.  
 
In the second column we add sector imports and exports interactions with multilateral 
exchange rate. The results do not change. In additional the input imports coefficient is 
negative and statistically significant at 5%. In the third column we have both exchange 
rate and interest rate interaction terms and foreign currency debt and local currency debt 
as additional controls. The exchange rate interaction term is negative and statistically 
significant at 1% level, but the interest rate interaction term is not significantly different 
from zero. The external debt coefficient is about 0.12 and is statistically significant at 
5%, whereas the internal debt term is close to zero and insignificant. This reinforces the 
interpretation of the paragraph above, that the only type of debt that is correlated with 
investment is the debt in foreign currency. 
 
5.3 Macroeconomic environment and balance sheet effects 
 
The main question in this subsection is if the balance sheet effect of exchange rate 
and interest rate were affected by the change in the macroeconomic environment. We 
evaluate if the balance sheet effects were affected by the two major macroeconomic 
reforms: the Real Plan, in 1994, and the change in the exchange rate regime, in 1999. For  16
that we take the period of 1995 to 1998 as our basis period and add slope dummies for the 
balance sheet effects in the high inflation (1990-1994) and floating exchange rate (1999-
2001) periods.  
 
In the first column of table 9 we report the results for the interaction between 
exchange rate devaluation and debt in foreign currency. The result for the base period is 
not significantly different from zero. The additional effect for the floating exchange rate 
period is negative and statistically significant at 1%, indicating that the effect we found in 
the regressions for the whole period is due to this subperiod. Furthermore, the coefficient 
for floating period (which is the sum of the coefficient for the base period plus the slope 
dummy coefficient for this period) is of the same order of magnitude of the coefficient 
found before for the whole period. When we add controls for the competitiveness effect 
(exports and imports interactions) the results are not qualitatively affected, as seen in the 
second column. Then we let both exchange rate and interest rate interactions to be 
different in subperiods. The results for the exchange rate interaction are maintained, and 
all coefficients related to the interest rate effect are insignificant. 
 
The exercise just proposed is based on particular priors of when the effects changed. 
Alternatively we allow for a different effect of dollar debt for each year. In this case, if 
we divide the obtained coefficient by the exchange rate variation, we could obtain the 
coefficient of the interaction between exchange rate devaluation and dollar debt for each 
year. If these coefficients are constant, the points in the plot of debt coefficient for a year 
versus exchange rate depreciation in the same year should be along a straight line. 
 
The results are shown in the fourth column. We see that there are only two 
coefficients significantly different from zero. Those are positive coefficients, and 
correspond to the years of 1996 and 1998. In those years, there were only moderate 
changes in the exchange rate, and in opposite directions. However, we have identified 
two effects linking investment to external debt: a positive effect, related to investment 
financing, and a negative balance sheet effect. Those two effects cannot be disentangled 
in this experiment. The significant positive coefficients of 1996 and 1998 probably reflect 
the former effect. 
 
5.4 Capital market imperfections 
5.4.1 Main insights  
 
 
With perfect capital markets investment is determined without reference to financial 
factors. A standard formulation is due to Hayashi (1982), where investment demand is 
related to Tobin’s q
8 – the ratio between investment market value and its replacement 
cost. Balance-sheet effects should be relevant for firms’ investment when market 
imperfections create a wedge between the cost of internal and external finance. Then, if a 
                                                 
8 In fact, theoretically what matter is the marginal q. Under certain assumptions the average q, which is 
empirically available may be used instead.   17
firm’s net worth is reduced the external finance premium increases, affecting negatively 
investment (see Bernake and Gertler, 1995). As a consequence, a proxy for net worth 
should affect investment, given the same financial opportunities, which are captured by q.  
 
For our purposes, controlling for q could be more fruitful, because under certain 
conditions all variables that could affect the profitability of investment can be subsumed 
in q. If an exchange rate devaluation improves investment opportunities, for example, q 
should be increased. Then q should increase with a devaluation for an export firm, and 
also for a firm which produces tradable goods for the domestic market. Conversely a 
devaluation should cause a decrease in q for a non-tradable firm largely dependent on 
imported inputs. Therefore, this control should be able to capture the competitiveness 
effect more widely than the ones based on exports and imported inputs. Another 
advantage is that q, being a forward-looking variable dependent on expectations, could 
also reflect the extent to which a devaluation is believed to be temporary or permanent.  
 
As we argued before, investment could be reduced when there is an exchange rate 
devaluation if a firm suffers financial distress because it is largely indebted in dollars, and 
this is the main effect we want to assess. However, this outcome depends on the existence 
of capital market imperfections. If capital markets were perfect the balance sheet effect 
would not occur even if the firm were heavily indebted in dollars. Therefore, tests for 
capital market imperfections are intrinsically related to tests for balance sheet effects. In 
the financial literature q has a crucial role in the tests for capital market imperfections, 
because it is considered a good control for investment opportunities. 
  
On the other hand, the so called competitiveness effect on investment should be 
entirely captured by q. Then, controlling for q should allow us to separate the 
competitiveness and balance sheet effects. Therefore, in this context there is no further 
need of other terms related to export and import orientation or tradability in order to 
capture the competitiveness effect. 
 
A usual proxy for net worth in the investment literature is cash flow.
9 Despite the 
importance of cash flow for investment, it does not capture in principle all the net worth 
effect of an exchange rate change variation. Although exchange rate devaluations tend to 
increase financial expenses of firms indebted in dollars, therefore affecting cash flow 
directly, it also increases debt. Thus, as shown by Bleakley and Cowan (2002), the 
increase in current expenses is only a part of the negative effect on net worth. 
  
We start with a test of capital market imperfections - which is a necessary condition 
for a balance sheet effect - by evaluating the effect of cash flows on investment, after 
controlling for q. We run the following regression: 
                                                 
9 In Brazil, Terra (2003) studied capital market imperfections in a panel with firm level balance sheet data 
from 1986 to 1997. She found evidence that Brazilian firms were credit constrained with exception of large 
and multinational firms. However, she does not use q, because her sample includes unlisted firms. Then 
one could argue that investment opportunities were not adequately controlled, and therefore would be 
reflected in cash flows. 
  18
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(2) 
where  it q  and   it CF  are firm’s i Tobin’s q and cash flows at time t, respectively, and the 
other variables are as in the equation before. A positive and significant coefficient λ  may 
be interpreted as evidence of capital market imperfections. 
 
Then, we test for exchange rate balance sheet effects on investment using q to control 
for competitive effects. We run the regression: 
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  We also add external debt and leverage as controls. 
 
We then proceed with a more detailed investigation on the specific channels for the 
exchange rate balance sheet effect. First, we test if there is an effect of exchange 
devaluation for firms highly indebted in dollars, even after controlling for cash flows. We 
then add leverage and external debts for a more complete set of financial related controls.  
 
It is natural to think that if exchange rate balance sheet effects are important, 
exchange rate depreciation will affect more negatively the cash flow of indebted firms. 
This could be the channel through which an exchange rate devaluation has a negative 
balance sheet effect on investment. In order to test this hypothesis we run the following 
regression: 
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where MRER denotes the multilateral real exchange rate, X the sector exports, and M 
the sector imports. As before, we added import and export terms to control for the 
competitiveness effect. However, cash flow is not only a financial variable. A firm in the 
tradable sector could benefit from the devaluation and produce more, despite having 
dollar debt and also being negatively affected by the devaluation. The effect on cash flow 
could be ambiguous in this case. On the other hand, we one may also be interested in 
investigate if there is a negative exchange rate balance sheet effect in production. Since 
there is no production, we ran an equivalent (to equation 4) regression for sales. 
 
5.4.2 Main results 
 
We start by estimating equation (2), which can be considered a test of capital market 
imperfections. The result is reported in the first column of table 10. The coefficient of the  19
q variable is not statistically significant, but the coefficient of cash flow is positive and 
statistically significant at 1% level. This could be interpreted and evidence in favor of 
imperfect capital markets, corroborating the findings of Terra (2003) for Brazil. 
 
  The existence of imperfect capital markets is a necessary condition for the 
exchange rate balance sheet effect. Thus, the next question is that if using q as a control 
for investment opportunities, which includes the competitiveness effect, we can capture 
the balance sheet effect. Thus, in the second column we run regression (3). The 
coefficient of the dollar debt-exchange rate interaction is positive, but is not statistically 
different from zero. We then add external debt and leverage as additional controls. Then, 
the coefficient becomes negative and statistically significant at 1%. In order to investigate 
how much of the balance sheet effect is related to cash flow, we finally add cash flow as 
an additional control. Then the magnitude of the dollar debt-exchange rate interaction is 
halved and its degree of significance reduced to 10%. This suggests that an important part 
of the negative balance sheet effect happens through cash flow reductions. 
 
  In order to test this hypothesis we estimate equation (4), which has cash flow as 
the dependent variable. The results are shown in the first column of table 11. The 
coefficient gamma is negative and statistically significant at 1% level. Furthermore, its 
magnitude is about ten times the gamma coefficients found in investment equations. 
Since profits depend also on production, one may wonder if all this effect on cash flows 
come from higher finance expense or if production is reduced. He tried to answer this 
question by estimating equation (4) with sales in the place of cash flows.  Our main effect 
is still negative and significant at 1% level, and its magnitude is now even higher. 
 
  
 5.4.3 Testing for heterogeneity 
 
It is in the tradition of the literature of capital market imperfections to test for 
differential effects between group of firms. The idea is to select groups that have 
characteristics related to access to capital markets. Then a hypothesis to be tested, for 
example, is that if the investment of the group with presumably less access to capital 
markets is more sensitive to cash flows. A natural extension to our setting would be then 
to test if the balance sheet effect is stronger for those groups of firms.  We estimate the 
equation: 
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where SD is a dummy that is equal to one if a firm is small. We then test if ψ  is 
significantly greater than zero, which could be interpreted as meaning that exchange rate 
balance sheet effects are more important for small firms. Then we do a similar regression  20
where SD equal to one when the firm is of the tradable sector, has ADR, or it is owned by 
foreigners.  
  
  The results are reported in table 12. In the first columns we test for heterogeneity 
between small and large capitalization firms. The slope dummy coefficient has a positive 
sign, but smaller in magnitude than the gamma coefficient. This indicates that small firms 
still bear a negative balance sheet effect, but its intensity is smaller than the one faced by 
large firms, which is not the expected result. However, none of the coefficients are 
statistically significant, indicating a large dispersion within each group. 
 
When the firms are divided according to the other criteria, the main effect continues 
to be negative and statistically significant at 1%. However, the it is not possible to reject 
the null that the two groups face the same effect. 
  
5.5 Asymmetric effects of exchange rate variation 
 
  Our aim in this section is to test if there are asymmetric exchange rate balance 
sheet effects on investment, cash flows and sales. With this objective, we modify the 
basic regression (1) by decomposing the interaction between exchange rate variations and 
dollar debt into two effects: one for depreciations and another for appreciations. We 
repeat the experiment for cash flows and sales. The results are reported in table 13. 
 
  The depreciation interaction coefficients are negative, statistically significant, and 
have magnitude similar to the gamma coefficients we found when we did not 
discriminate between depreciations and appreciations. The appreciation coefficients are 
not significantly different from zero. Those features emerge in all three estimations, 
which clearly indicate that the negative balance sheet effects we found were due to 
depreciations. This asymmetry reinforces the interpretation that the negative effect of the 
interaction between debt in foreign currency and exchange rate variation is due to balance 
sheet effects, since those appear more likely to be asymmetric than the ones related to 
competitiveness.  
 
     
6. Macroeconomic Implications and Final Remarks 
 
In our investigation we found a robust negative balance sheet effect of exchange rate 
depreciations on investment. The effect is due mostly to the period of floating exchange 
rate regime in Brazil. It also strongly impacts cash flows and sales, and is asymmetric, 
since only depreciations matter. 
 
One important aspect not to be missed is that a significant part of Brazilian large 
firms hedge against exchange rate variation. However, we were not able to account for 
that because individual measures of the hedged position are not available. As a 
consequence, the impact on non-hedged firms tends to be even higher than the numbers 
we found.   21
 
A question of natural interest is how important are the aggregate effects. Our sample 
is composed only by listed firms, which are relatively large in Brazil. The extrapolation 
of those results faces some difficulties. First, we do not have any measure of the 
indebtedness in foreign currency of the unlisted firms. We could speculate that the 
majority of those firms are smaller and do not have access to loans in foreign currency. 
We would be led conclude that the aggregate effect will be less important than the 
average effect in our sample. However, since the government is the net provider of hedge 
for the private sector, devaluations entail an additional negative effect, which is the 
deterioration of government’s financial health. In an emerging market economy, the 
composition of those two effects could make it prone to macroeconomic instability. 
 
An interesting policy question is how to compare a crawling peg regime, such as the 
one between 1995 and 1998, to the free floating regime, from 1999 on. In the former, the 
instability and public accounts deterioration were generated by the high and variable level 
of interest rates necessary to control the exchange rate. In the floating regime, the risk 
should in principle be incurred by the private debtor, engendering exchange rate balance 
sheet effects that were not present in the crawling peg period. Those balance sheet effects 
ought to be attenuated when firms are partially hedged by the government, as it was the 
case in Brazil. However, as argued above, this government’s decision generates an 
additional channel of instability. 
  
One could argue that the problem could be avoided in the free floating regime, if the 
government abstained from providing hedge to the private sector. Would we find then 
stronger exchange rate balance sheet effects? Without government intervention, hedge 
provided by the private sector would be substantially more expensive, and a firm before 
borrowing in foreign currency should take into account either the risk involved or the 
expensive cost of hedge.  
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1990.03 - Collor Plan froze liquid financial assets creating a big liquidity squeeze (from 30% to 8% of 
GDP). Payments on government debt would be suspended for 18 months.
- Creation of a commercial market for foreign exchange rates transactions involving goods, 
complementing the floating market for restricted financial transaction.
1991.01 - 2nd  Collor Plan: heterodox stabilization plan based on price freezing.
1991.05 - New and more orthodox economic team. Creation of the so-called Annex IV , which provided 
a channel for foreign investment in domestic security markets.
1991.07 - Rules for borrowing external resources though the ADR/IDR mechanism were adopted.
1991.09 - Devaluation of 14%
1991.11 - Privatization plan successfully started.
1992.09 - Impeachment of President Collor, replaced by Vice-President Itamar Franco
1993.05 - Fernando Henrique Cardoso was chosen Finance Minister. He and his team would formulate 
the Real Plan
1993.10 - First ADR was issued.
1994.05 - A new unit account URV was created to hyper-index the economy, as a preparation for the 
Real Plan
1994.07 - The new currency was created based on the URV, and inflation fell abruptly. De-indexation of 
contracts. Exchange rate was set an upper limit of 1, but no lower limit and was let to appreciate.
1994.10 - Fernando Henrique Cardoso elected president
1994.11 -  Mexican crisis would affect capital inflows to Brazil.
1995.03 - Exchange rate band system was formerly adopted, with a band of 5%. Exchange rate was 
devalued in 5.2%.
1995.07 - Periodic exchange rate spread auction was started, establishing very narrow limits for exchange 
rate fluctuations.
1995.11 - As a response to the banking crisis caused by the dissipation of inflation tax, the government 
instituted a program known as PROER to facilitate the restructuring of the private banking 
sector.
1996.02 - US$8.2 billion bailout of Banco do Brasil
1996.10 - Financial transactions tax of 0.2% approved by the Congress.
1997.10 - Asian crisis affected capital flows to Brazil.
1998.10 - President Fernando Henrique Cardoso was reelected.
1998.07 - Russian crisis affected capital flows to Brazil.
1999.01 - The Central Bank announced 15% exchange rate devaluation on 01/14 and the creation of new 
band system. Currency was left to float three days later.
2000.06 - The Congress passed the Fiscal Reponsability Law restricting State and Municipalities ability 
to generate budget deficits.
2001.03 - Government reacted to energy crisis (low level of water stocks) imposing energy rationing. 
Contagion from Argentina crisis.
2002 - From May on deterioration of the international perception of Brazilian risk due to the prospect 
of a leftist government: sharp devaluation of currency and depreciation of Brazilian bonds.






























































Volatility of Real Exchange Rate variation and Real 
Interest Rate
































































































































































































































































N. OBS MEAN MEDIAN
Country level data
ln(1+r) 3312 0,1359 0,1509
∆ ln(RER) 3312 0,0198 0,0213
σ  (lnRER) 3312 0,0598 0,0247
σ  (∆ lnRER) 3312 0,0453 0,0206
σ  (IPCA) 3312 0,1008 0,0059
Firm level data
D*/DT 3312 0,1371 0,0000
D*/K 3249 0,3289 0,0000
DT/K 3249 2,7705 0,3906
I/K 2928 0,0432 0,0000
Q Tobin 2047 0,8964 0,8454
Sales/K 2882 35,0243 1,4508
CF/K-1 2882 5,8565 0,0904
Country & Firm level data interactions
D*/K * ∆ ln(RER)  3249 0,0594 0,0000
DLC/K * ln(1+r)  3249 19,7046 1,4958
Exp*MultRER 2015 0,3412 0,2975
Imp*MultRER 2015 0,1296898 0,1120636
Table 3 - Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 -  Number of firms in sample per yearTable 4 - Estimation of Debt Currency Composition
Dependent Variable:  Debt in Foreign Currency / Total Debt (D*/DT)
Ln(K) 0,135 *** 0,094 *** 0,094 *** 0,096 ***
(0,013) (0,013) (0,013) (0,014)
Ln(K)*σσσσ (∆∆∆∆ lnRER) -0,906 *** -0,677 *** -0,679 *** -0,682 ***
(0,145) (0,159) (0,159) (0,159)






Constant -0,441 *** -0,531 *** -0,522 *** -0,541 ***
(0,032) (0,041) (0,041) (0,052)
Pseudo R
2 0,033 0,0251 0,0258 0,0259
N Obs 3248 2557 2557 2557
LR 136,3 81,36 83,39 83,75
(0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)
Table 5 - Estimation of Debt Maturity Composition
Dependent Variable: Long Term Debt / Total Debt (DLT/DT)
Ln(K) -0,020 *** -0,006 ** -0,006 ** -0,006 **
(0,002) (0,003) (0,003) (0,003)
Ln(K)*s (inflation) 0,015 * -0,096 *** -0,096 *** -0,096 ***
(0,008) (0,020) (0,020) (0,020)
Yeld Activitty






Constant 0,825 *** 0,856 *** 0,854 *** 0,857 ***
(0,006) (0,008) (0,008) (0,012)
Pseudo R2 0,0533 0,0818 0,0833 0,0834
N Obs 3248 2557 2557 2557
LR 77,38 90,2 91,88 91,98
(0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)
Standard deviation are in parentesis for parameters estimation.
P-values are reported in parentesis for test statistics.
Tobit Model Estimation, the lower limit level is set to be 0.
∆ Ln(K) means the difference of the log mean firm`s capital
The Yield acticity is in percentage form, the debt in between 0 and 1.Table 6
Dependent Variable:  I/K 
OLS WG GMM-Diff GMM-Sys OLS WG GMM-Diff GMM-Sys
(I/K) -1 -0,149 * -0,214 *** -0,110 -0,047
(0,08) (0,08) (0,14) (0,14)
(DFC/K) -1 * ∆∆∆∆ ln(RER) -0,330 ** -0,391 ** -0,386 *** -0,379 *** -0,316 ** -0,356 ** -0,292 *** -0,241
(0,15) (0,17) (0,10) (0,13) (0,14) (0,14) (0,09) (0,20)
(DFC/K) -1 0,086 ** 0,109 ** 0,165 *** 0,114 *** 0,082 ** 0,101 ** 0,137 *** 0,062
(0,04) (0,05) (0,03) (0,04) (0,04) (0,04) (0,03) (0,07)
(DT/K) -1 2,11E-04 0,004 0,002 0,001 8,00E-05 0,001 0,002 0,000
(2,92E-04) (2,46E-03) (2,80E-03) (1,17E-03) (3,13E-04) (1,44E-03) (5,31E-03) (1,59E-03)
Constant 0,772 *** -1,018 *** 0,771 *** -0,010 0,031 -0,257
(0,229) (0,371) (0,229) (0,094) (0,139) (0,203)
R
2 0,030 0,034 0,056 0,104
N 2877 2864 2527 2864 2541 2519 2201 2519
Wald (time) 41,450 *** 36,660 *** 35,510 *** 45,230 *** 28,330 *** 23,080 ** 25,270 *** 25,820 ***
(0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,002) (0,010) (0,005) (0,004)
AR(1) -1,201 -1,556 -2,176 ** -2,211 ** 0,857 0,346 -1,479 -1,647 *
(0,230) (0,120) (0,030) (0,027) (0,391) (0,729) (0,139) (0,100)
AR(2) -1,158 -2,145 ** -0,074 0,057 -0,653 -2,384 * -0,507 0,175
(0,247) (0,032) (0,941) (0,954) (0,514) (0,017) (0,612) (0,861)
Sargan 83,240 108,700 221,000 *** 267,900 ***
(0,986) (0,985) (0,000) (0,000)
Standard errors are in parentesis for parametrs estimation.
P-values are reported in parentesis for test statistics.
The dynamic panel estimation uses GMM difference estimators, which are based on Arellano and Bond (1991).  
GMM results are one step estimates with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and test statistics.
GMM difference and system regressions use instruments lagged 2 to 6 periods in general.
AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation, asymptotically N(0,1).
Time dummies are included in all equations.
The Wald (time) statistics tests the hypothesis that the time-dummy coefficients are jointly zero.
The sargan test is determined by the two step estimation to avoid the bias from heteroskedasticityTable 7
Dependent Variable:  I/K 
GMM Diff GMM Diff GMM Diff
(I/K) -1 -0,384 *** -0,105 -0,130
(0,047) (0,141) (0,091)
(DFC/K) -1 * ∆∆∆∆ ln(RER) -0,262 *** -0,340 ** -0,308 ***
(0,075) (0,134) (0,093)
(DFC/K) -1 0,134 *** 0,107 ** 0,126 ***
(0,012) (0,045) (0,030)








Imp*MultRER -1,106 * -0,701
(0,589) (0,497)
Constant -0,252 ** 0,147 -0,049
(0,112) (0,282) (0,089)
N 1372 2200 1371
Wald (time) 14,630 22,300 ** 9,463
(0,146) (0,014) (0,489)
AR(1) -1,685 * -1,824 * -1,851 *
(0,092) (0,068) (0,064)
AR(2) -2,527 ** -0,358 -0,643
(0,012) (0,720) (0,521)
Sargan 186,800 268,800 205,200
(0,979) (0,132) (1,000)
Standard errors are in parentesis for parametrs estimation.
P-values are reported in parentesis for test statistics.
The dynamic panel estimation uses GMM difference estimators, which are based on Arellano and Bond (1991).  
GMM results are one step estimates with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and test statistics.
GMM difference and system regressions use instruments lagged 2 to 6 periods in general.
AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation, asymptotically N(0,1).
Time dummies are included in all equations.
The Wald (time) statistics tests the hypothesis that the time-dummy coefficients are jointly zero.
The sargan test is determined by the two step estimation to avoid the bias from heteroskedasticityTable 8
Dependent Variable:  I/K 
GMM-Diff GMM-Diff GMM-Diff
(I/K) -1 -0,148 -0,142 -0,114
(0,107) (0,094) (0,140)
(D*/K) -1 * ∆∆∆∆ ln(RER) -0,334 ***
(0,129)
(D*/K) -1 0,117 **
(0,048)
(DLC/K) -1 * ln(1+r) 0,001 -0,001 3,95E-04
(0,001) (0,001) (4,38E-04)
(DLC/K) -1 -0,115 *** -0,125 *** 0,003
(0,034) (0,023) (0,003)






Constant -0,034 -0,036 0,005
(0,168) (0,052) (0,135)
N 2201 1372 2201
Wald (time) 25,830 *** 16,020 * 24,900 ***
(0,004) (0,099) (0,006)
AR(1) -1,482 -1,601 -1,510
(0,138) (0,109) (0,131)
AR(2) -0,699 *** -0,079 -0,484
(0,485) (0,937) (0,628)
Sargan 255,9 *** 209,4 261,0 **
(0,000) (0,988) (0,017)
Standard errors are in parentesis for parametrs estimation.
P-values are reported in parentesis for test statistics.
The dynamic panel estimation uses GMM difference estimators, which are based on Arellano and Bond (1991).  
GMM results are one step estimates with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and test statistics.
GMM difference and system regressions use instruments lagged 2 to 6 periods in general.
AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation, asymptotically N(0,1).
Time dummies are included in all equations.
The Wald (time) statistics tests the hypothesis that the time-dummy coefficients are jointly zero.
The sargan test is determined by the two step estimation to avoid the bias from heteroskedasticityTable 9
Dependent Variable:  I/K-1 Dependent Variable:  I/K-1
GMM-Diff GMM-Diff GMM-Diff GMM-Diff   ∆∆   ∆∆ ln(RER)
(I/K-1) -1 -0,112 -0,139 -0,112 (I/K-1) -1 -0,109
(0,141) (0,094) (0,142) (0,143)
(D*/K) -1 * ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ln(RER) 0,894 0,284 0,882 (D*/K) -1D1990 2,149E-13 -0,141
(0,505) (0,364) (0,511) (2,59E-13)
(D*/K) -1 * ∆∆∆∆ ln(RER) * D_90_94 0,242 -12,933 0,122 (D*/K) -1D1991 -2,257E-13 0,096
(1,411) (20,140) (1,419) (3,66E-13)
(D*/K) -1 * ∆∆∆∆ ln(RER) * D_99_02 -1,103 *** -0,638 ** -1,091 *** (D*/K) -1D1992 -2,563E-12 -0,051
(0,393) (0,283) (0,399) (2,76E-12)
(D*/K) -1 0,070 * 0,132 *** 0,050 (D*/K) -1D1993 -0,399 0,021
(0,048) (0,028) (0,034) (1,094)
(DLC/K) -1 * ln(1+r) 9,86E-04 (D*/K) -1D1994 -0,450 -0,354
(1,04E-03) (0,628)
(DLC/K) -1 * ln(1+r) * D90_94 2,60E-04 (D*/K) -1D1995 8,813 -0,063
(9,27E-04) (9,358)
(DLC/K) -1 * ln(1+r) * D99_02 -4,01E-04 (D*/K) -1D1996 0,154 *** -0,025
(4,77E-04) (0,021)
(DLC/K) -1 -0,024 (D*/K) -1D1997 0,029 0,021
(0,016) (0,053)
(D/K) -1 4,40E-03 4,81E-03 0,026 (D*/K) -1D1998 0,148 *** 0,063
(4,81E-03) (3,18E-03) (0,018) (0,012)
Exp*MultRER 0,011 (D*/K) -1D1999 0,031 0,306
(0,224) (0,028)
Imp*MultRER -1,024 * (D*/K) -1D2000 0,002 0,031
(0,541) (0,020)
(D*/K) -1D2001 -0,006 0,097
(0,034)




Constant 0,028 -0,028 0,033 Constant 0,032
(0,138) (0,051) (0,138) (0,138)
N 2201 1372 2201 N 2201
Wald (time) 23,610 *** 9,550 ** 23,840 *** Wald (time) 22,360 **
(0,009) (0,014) (0,008) (0,013)
AR(1) -1,507 -1,556 -1,505 AR(1) -1,478
(0,132) (0,120) (0,132) (0,139)
AR(2) -0,415 -0,237 -0,417 AR(2) -0,537
(0,678) (0,813) (0,677) (0,592)
Sargan 224,7 *** 202,0 2,08E+06 *** Sargan 195,1 ***
(0,003) (0,971) (0,000) (0,000)
Standard errors are in parentesis for parametrs estimation.
P-values are reported in parentesis for test statistics.
The dynamic panel estimation uses GMM difference estimators, which are based on Arellano and Bond (1991).  
GMM results are one step estimates with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and test statistics.
GMM difference and system regressions use instruments lagged 2 to 6 periods in general.
AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation, asymptotically N(0,1).
Time dummies are included in all equations.
The Wald (time) statistics tests the hypothesis that the time-dummy coefficients are jointly zero.
Ratio means de result of (estimated D* versus year dummy coeficient / difference of Ln(RER))  
The sargan test is determined by the two step estimation to avoid the bias from heteroskedasticityTable 10
Dependent Variable:  I/K-1
GMM-Diff GMM-Diff GMM-Diff GMM-Diff
(I/K-1) -1 0,073 0,019 0,041 0,052
(0,051) (0,071) (0,055) (0,053)
Q Tobin -0,059 -0,150 -0,180 -0,133
(0,346) (0,367) (0,277) (0,220)
CF/K 0,130 *** 0,087 **
(0,019) (0,036)
(D*/K) -1 * ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ln(RER) 0,930 -0,430 *** -0,221 *
(0,632) (0,084) (0,118)
(D*/K) -1 0,169 *** 0,049
(0,018) (0,049)
(D/K) -1 0,013 * 0,016 **
(0,007) (0,007)
Constant -0,308 -0,226 * -0,201 -0,274
(0,199) (0,128) (0,125) (0,170)
N 1322 1323 1323 1322
Wald (time) 19,940 ** 20,910 ** 18,200 * 17,140 *
(0,030) (0,022) (0,052) (0,071)
AR(1) -2,000 ** -2,003 ** -1,747 * -1,829 *
(0,046) (0,045) (0,081) (0,067)
AR(2) 1,314 1,513 1,117 1,149
(0,189) (0,130) (0,264) (0,250)
Sargan 168,6 ** 157,9 ** 208,4 220,3
(0,011) (0,043) (0,614) (0,957)
Standard errors are in parentesis for parametrs estimation.
P-values are reported in parentesis for test statistics.
The dynamic panel estimation uses GMM difference estimators, which are based on Arellano and Bond (1991).  
GMM results are one step estimates with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and test statistics.
GMM difference and system regressions use instruments lagged 2 to 6 periods in general.
AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation, asymptotically N(0,1).
Time dummies are included in all equations.
The Wald (time) statistics tests the hypothesis that the time-dummy coefficients are jointly zero.
The sargan test is determined by the two step estimation to avoid the bias from heteroskedasticityTable11
Dependent Variable:  X/K 
X=Cash Flow X=Sales
GMM-Diff GMM-Diff
(X/K) -1 6,67E-06 -0,001
(6,44E-05) (0,001)
(D*/K) -1 * ∆∆∆∆ ln(RER) -2,652 *** -13,707 ***
(0,629) (4,104)
(D*/K) -1 1,327 *** 6,412 ***
(0,201) (0,613)
(D/K) -1 0,057 0,102
(0,142) (0,121)















Standard errors are in parentesis for parametrs estimation.
P-values are reported in parentesis for test statistics.
The dynamic panel estimation uses GMM difference estimators, which are based on Arellano and Bond (1
GMM results are one step estimates with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and test statistics.
GMM difference and system regressions use instruments lagged 2 to 6 periods in general.
AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation, asymptotically N(0,1).
Time dummies are included in all equations.
The Wald (time) statistics tests the hypothesis that the time-dummy coefficients are jointly zero.
The sargan test is determined by the two step estimation to avoid the bias from heteroskedasticityTable 12
Dependent Variable:  I/K 
GMM-Diff GMM-Diff GMM-Diff GMM-Diff
I/K (-1) 0,042 0,050 0,050 0,049
(0,054) (0,056) (0,056) (0,056)
Q Tobin -0,247 -0,099 -0,118 -0,110
(0,287) (0,267) (0,263) (0,264)
(D*/K) -1 * ∆∆∆∆ ln(RER) -1,502 -0,329 *** -0,278 *** -0,356 ***
(1,445) (0,103) (0,081) (0,117)
(D*/K) -1 * ∆∆∆∆ ln(RER) * SD 1,095
(1,436)
(D*/K) -1 * ∆∆∆∆ ln(RER) * DADR 0,392
(0,394)
(D*/K) -1 * Dln(RER) * DFO -0,838
(0,771)
(D*/K) -1 * Dln(RER) * DTradable 0,363
(0,290)
(D*/K) -1 0,167 *** 0,152 *** 0,167 *** 0,154 ***
(0,017) (0,029) (0,015) (0,024)
(D/K) -1 0,014 ** 0,012 * 0,012 * 0,012 *
(0,007) (0,007) (0,006) (0,006)
Constant -0,191 -0,215 * -0,211 * -0,213 *
(0,123) (0,123) (0,124) (0,124)
N 1323 1287 1287 1287
Wald (time) 17,660 * 38,370 *** 42,920 *** 47,700 ***
(0,061) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)
AR(1) -1,746 * -1,763 * -1,758 * -1,765 *
(0,081) (0,078) (0,079) (0,078)
AR(2) 1,122 1,202 1,183 1,200
(0,262) (0,229) (0,237) (0,230)
Sargan 193,0 199,9 193,0 197,1
[0.749] [0.626] (0,648) [0.678]
Standard errors are in parentesis for parametrs estimation.
P-values are reported in parentesis for test statistics.
The dynamic panel estimation uses GMM difference estimators, which are based on Arellano and Bond (1991).  
GMM results are one step estimates with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and test statistics.
GMM difference and system regressions use instruments lagged 2 to 6 periods in general.
AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation, asymptotically N(0,1).
Time dummies are included in all equations.
The Wald (time) statistics tests the hypothesis that the time-dummy coefficients are jointly zero.
The sargan test is determined by the two step estimation to avoid the bias from heteroskedasticityTable 13
Dependent Variable:  X/K 
X=Investment X=Cash Flow X=Sales
GMM-Diff GMM Diff GMM-Diff
X/K (-1) -0,113 0,003 0,018
(0,141) (0,005) (0,025)
(D*/K) -1 * ∆∆∆∆ ln(RER)*deval -0,297 ** -2,990 *** -12,225 ***
(0,136) (0,808) (4,463)
(D*/K) -1 * ∆∆∆∆ ln(RER)*val -1,143 7,654 48,966
(1,573) (10,430) (47,570)
(D*/K) -1  0,106 ** 1,270 *** 5,259 ***
(0,049) (0,345) (1,767)
(D/K) -1  0,006 0,011 0,002
(0,005) (0,085) (0,206)
Constant 0,027 -6,335 -58,400
(0,138) (8,004) (82,820)
N 2201 2186 2186
Wald (time) 25,140 *** 17,930 * 20,700 **
(0,005) (0,056) (0,023)
AR(1) -1,494 -1,601 -1,867 *
(0,135) (0,109) (0,062)
AR(2) -0,490 0,507 1,114
(0,624) (0,612) (0,265)
Sargan 590,000 *** 343,700 *** 105,400
(0,000) (0,000) (1,000)
Standard errors are in parentesis for parametrs estimation.
P-values are reported in parentesis for test statistics.
The dynamic panel estimation uses GMM difference estimators, which are based on Arellano and Bond (1991).  
GMM results are one step estimates with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and test statistics.
GMM difference and system regressions use instruments lagged 2 to 6 periods in general.
AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation, asymptotically N(0,1).
Time dummies are included in all equations.
The Wald (time) statistics tests the hypothesis that the time-dummy coefficients are jointly zero.
The sargan test is determined by the two step estimation to avoid the bias from heteroskedasticityTable A.1 - Description of the Variables (Firs Part)
This table describes the variables used throughout the study.
Variable Description
Country Level Variables
Nominal interest rate Is the rate on loans issued by the financial sector. Corresponds to the selic rate on 
30 days. 
Real interest rate Corresponds to the nominal interest rate adjusted by the inflation price index 
variation over the same time period
Nominal exchange 
rate
Is the ratio between Real and US dollars, collected monthly, end of period.
Real exchange rate Corresponds to the nominal exchange rate adjusted by the inflation price index.
Multilateral real 
exchange rate
Corresponds to the relative cost of a common basket of goods measured in terms of 
a common numeraire. We calculated a bilateral real exchange rate for each 
Brazilian trade partner as follows:
in which e corresponds to the nominal exchange rate between the countries and 
WPI corresponds to the wholesale price index. The multilateral real exchange rate 
is than an average of those bilateral exchange rates weighted by Brazilian 
international trade weights.
Inflation (IPCA) A broad consumer price index, collected monthly. This index was used to deflate 
all variables in the study except investment. During the estimation procedure, we 
accumulated the monthly variation to construct the annual series.
Price Level on 
Investment
An investment price index used to deflate the investment variable. It is available in 
the Penn World Table.
Real interest rate 
volatility - σσσσ (ln(1+r))
It is the volatility of the log of the real interest rate, accumulated during the year.
Inflation price index 
variation volatility - 
σσσσ (IPCA)
It is the volatility of the broad consumer price index monthly variation.
Real exchange rate 
volatility - σσσσ (lnRER) 
It is the volatility of the log of the real exchange rate.
Real exchange rate 
variation volatility - 
σσσσ (DlnRER) 
It is the volatility of the log of the real exchange rate monthly variation.
Credit Corresponds to the aggregated credit provided by the financial sector to the 
industrial sector divided by the GDP
Exports orientation 
(Exp)
Corresponds to the ratio of exports to production, calculated annually at industry 
level.




















) / (Table A.2 - Debt Composition
Year DLT/D DST/D D*/D DLC/D
1990 38,16% 61,84% 0,00% 100,00%
1991 34,26% 65,74% 0,00% 100,00%
1992 40,76% 59,24% 0,00% 100,00%
1993 39,79% 60,21% 0,29% 99,71%
1994 40,43% 59,57% 0,13% 99,87%
1995 39,51% 60,49% 0,37% 99,63%
1996 41,00% 59,00% 2,39% 97,61%
1997 46,72% 53,28% 5,21% 94,79%
1998 45,50% 54,66% 32,66% 67,34%
1999 45,20% 54,80% 35,63% 64,37%
2000 51,27% 48,73% 21,93% 78,07%
2001 49,76% 50,24% 37,11% 62,89%
2002 50,30% 49,70% 40,26% 59,74%
Mean 43,44% 56,58% 13,71% 86,29%
Year DST and LC/D DST and FC/D DLT and LC/D DLT and FC/D
1990 61,84% 0,00% 38,16% 0,00%
1991 65,74% 0,00% 34,26% 0,00%
1992 59,24% 0,00% 40,76% 0,00%
1993 59,92% 0,29% 39,79% 0,00%
1994 59,45% 0,11% 40,41% 0,02%
1995 60,15% 0,34% 39,48% 0,03%
1996 58,18% 0,82% 39,44% 1,56%
1997 50,38% 2,90% 44,41% 2,31%
1998 37,32% 17,34% 30,02% 15,33%
1999 35,77% 19,04% 28,61% 16,59%
2000 36,78% 11,95% 41,29% 9,98%
2001 31,87% 18,38% 31,02% 18,74%
2002 30,28% 19,43% 29,46% 20,84%
Mean 49,49% 7,09% 36,80% 6,62%
DLT/D Long term debt to total debt ratio
DST/D Short term debt to total debt ratio
D*/D Debt in foreign currency  to total debt ratio
DLC/D Debt in local currency  to total debt ratio
DST and LC/D Short term debt in local currency to total debt ratio
DST and FC/D Short term debt in foreign currency to total debt ratio
DLT and LC/D Long term debt in local currency to total debt ratio
DLT and FC/D Long term debt in foreign currency to total debt ratioTable A.3
 1990 to 2002 RER
Dependent Variable:  I/K 
04GMM1 04GMM2 12 22
OLS GMM-Diff OLS GMM-Diff OLS GMM Diff OLS GMM Diff
(I/K) -1 -0,149 * -0,119 -0,126 -0,123
(0,085) (0,137) (0,092) (0,091)
(D*/K) -1 * Dln(RER) -0,319 ** -0,301 ** -0,291 ** -0,289 ** -0,393 *** -0,426 *** -0,350 *** -0,390 ***
(0,158) (0,135) (0,135) (0,116) (0,053) (0,082) (0,045) (0,073)
Dln(RER) -0,125 0,359 -0,254 * -0,404 0,610 ** 0,670 0,143 0,038
(0,147) (0,274) (0,137) (0,288) (0,272) (0,470) (0,169) (0,177)
(D*/K) -1 0,080 * 0,121 ** 0,078 ** 0,107 ** 0,129 *** 0,175 *** 0,122 *** 0,161 ***
(0,042) (0,051) (0,037) (0,046) (0,025) (0,019) (0,021) (0,018)
(D/K) -1 7,86E-05 0,008 * 2,24E-04 0,006 1,93E-04 0,006 * 3,28E-04 0,005
(2,71E-04) (0,005) (2,92E-04) (0,005) (4,25E-04) (0,004) (4,19E-04) (0,003)
Exp*Dln(RER) -0,086 0,214 0,150 0,388 **
(0,246) (0,346) (0,167) (0,193)
Imp*Dln(RER) -1,774 ** -1,981 -0,400 -1,054 *
(0,867) (1,348) (0,627) (0,630)
Constant 0,033 * -0,041 *** -0,003 0,014 0,014 -0,013 -0,012 0,008
(0,020) (0,015) (0,021) (0,018) (0,022) (0,016) (0,015) (0,012)
N 0,006 0,050 0,049 0,160
2877 2527 2541 2201 1733 1495 1556 1325
Wald (joint)
5,347 9,119 * 13,110 ** 11,510 ** 95,960 *** 110,100 *** 152,600 *** 109,800 ***
AR(1) (0,254) (0,058) (0,022) (0,042) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)
-1,197 -2,185 ** 0,849 -1,520 0,160 -2,173 ** 1,010 -1,482
AR(2) (0,231) (0,029) (0,396) (0,128) (0,873) (0,030) (0,313) (0,138)
-1,162 -0,163 -0,721 -0,562 -0,561 -0,607 1,550 -0,770
Sargan (0,245) (0,871) (0,471) (0,574) (0,575) (0,544) (0,121) (0,441)
274,0 *** 250,2 ** 207,3 199,3
(0,009) (0,050) (0,100) (1,000)
Years 1991 to 1999
Dependent Variable:  I/K 
OLS GMM-Diff OLS GMM-Diff OLS GMM Diff OLS GMM Diff
(I/K) -1 -0,219 ** -0,215 ** -0,125 -0,112
(0,095) (0,107) (0,099) (0,100)
(D*/K) -1 * ∆∆∆∆ ln(RER) 0,037 -0,114 0,204 0,140 0,054 -0,102 * 0,146 -0,012
(0,198) (0,237) (0,190) (0,314) (0,187) (0,058) (0,194) (0,095)
∆∆∆∆ ln(RER) -0,171 -0,372 -0,178 -0,109 0,084 0,029 0,028 0,131
(0,175) (0,251) (0,171) (0,174) (0,178) (0,222) (0,172) (0,185)
(D*/K) -1 0,122 *** 0,175 *** 0,101 *** 0,137 *** 0,123 *** 0,173 *** 0,111 *** 0,160 ***
(0,007) (0,027) (0,010) (0,038) (0,006) (0,003) (0,010) (0,012)
(D/K) -1 9,55E-04 0,006 * 7,02E-04 0,007 * 9,26E-04 0,004 0,001 0,004
(6,33E-04) (0,003) (5,31E-04) (0,004) (7,04E-04) (0,003) (0,001) (0,003)
Exp*Dln(RER) 0,162 0,158 0,226 0,172
(0,168) (0,232) (0,169) (0,216)
Imp*Dln(RER) -0,208 -1,676 ** -0,090 -1,515 **
(0,685) (0,735) (0,685) (0,647)
Constant -0,028 0,028 -0,012 0,004 -0,030 0,039 * -0,019 0,023
(0,028) (0,022) (0,025) (0,013) (0,019) (0,022) (0,016) (0,014)
R
2 0,023 0,101 0,106 0,186
N 1938 1608 1838 1533 1275 1042 1240 1013
Wald (joint) 2119,00 *** 3070,0 *** 1886,000 *** 4260,0 *** 2488,00 *** 5601,0 *** 2684,0 *** 7106,0 ***
(0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)
AR(1) -1,279 -2,260 ** 0,555 -1,384 0,515 -1,764 0,714 -0,817
(0,201) (0,024) (0,579) (0,166) (0,607) (0,078) (0,475) (0,414)
AR(2) 1,058 1,293 -0,496 -0,243 0,500 0,527 0,390 0,041
(0,290) (0,196) (0,620) (0,808) (0,617) (0,599) (0,696) (0,967)
Sargan 5,409 3,201 175,7 176,3
(0,910) (0,976) (0,346) (0,368)
Standard errors are in parentesis for parametrs estimation.
P-values are reported in parentesis for test statistics.
The dynamic panel estimation uses GMM difference estimators, which are based on Arellano and Bond (1991).  
GMM difference and system regressions use instruments lagged 2 to 6 periods in general.
GMM results are one step estimates with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and test statistics.
AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation, asymptotically N(0,1).
The regressions do not have time dummies
The Wald (joint) statistics tests the hypothesis that the coefficients are jointly zero.
The sargan test is determined by the two step estimation to avoid the bias from heteroskedasticityFirm Level Variables
Sales It is a measure of total sales during the year
Investment It is a measure of the change in capital stock during the year to the capital stock at 
the beginning of the year, adjusted by the price level of investmen
Cash Flow Corresponds to the Net Income account accumulated during the year
Debt in Foreign 
Currency
It is a measure of the stock of debt denominated in foreign currency converted into 
local currency (using the exchange rate for the period in which the balance sheet is 
reported) at the end of the year
Tobin’Q It is a measure of the firms’ profitability constructed as the market value of assets 
divided by its the replacement cost. The numerator is the book value of assets 
minus the book value of common equity and deferred taxes plus the market value o
common equity. The denominator is the book value of assets.
FO (Ownership 
structure)
It is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the firm has foreign 
ownership.
Tradable It is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the firm is in a tradable 
industry (agriculture, food & beverage, manufacturing, mining, pulp & paper, oil &
gas, chemical, vehicle & parts, transportation services
ADR It is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the firm has issued an ADR in
the US market.
SD It’s a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm’s capital is smaller 
than the average database capital and zero otherwise
The sources of macroeconomic data are: Brazilian Central Bank, IPEA database, FUNCEX (Center of 
International Commerce Studies) web site and IFS system
The source of all firm-level variables used in the paper is Austin Asis database, except for the variables used 
in the construction of Tobin’s Q that were collected from Economatica system 
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